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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently took another step in the
series of examinations into the official conduct of former Nebraska
Attorney General Paul Douglas. In 1984 the court found that Douglas
had not committed impeachable acts while in office.1 In 1986 the court
decided that for purposes of the Nebraska perjury statute,2 a person
under oath cannot commit perjury while testifying before a legislative
committee, even if that person were to declare "any matter to be fact,
1. State v. Douglas, 217 Neb. 199, 349 N.W.2d 870 (1984).
2. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-915 (1985). Section 28-915(1) provides:
Perjury; subornation of perjury; penalty. (1) A person commits perjury
if, having given his oath or affirmation in any judicial proceeding or to
any affidavit on undertakings, bonds, or recognizances or in any other
matter where an oath or affirmation is required by law, he deposes, af-
firms or declares any matter to be fact, knowing the same to be false, or
denies any matter to be fact, knowing the same to be true. Id. (emphasis
added).
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knowing the same to be false or den[y] any matter to be fact, knowing
the same to be true."3 That decision, State v. Douglas,4 reversed
Douglas' perjury conviction. The conviction was based upon state-
ments made by Douglas while testifying before a legislative commit-
tee. This article will examine the coherency of the legal analysis in
State v. Douglas.
II. STATE v. DOUGLAS
A. Background
On November 1, 1983, Commonwealth Savings Company ("Com-
monwealth") was declared insolvent by the Nebraska Department of
Banking and Finance. On January 4, 1984, the Nebraska Unicameral
established the Commonwealth Committee ("Committee") to investi-
gate the circumstances of the Commonwealth failure.5 On February 9,
1984, the Committee authorized their chairperson to set a date to in-
vestigate the actions of then Attorney General Paul Douglas in rela-
tion to Commonwealth. 6 On February 25, 1984, Douglas appeared
before the Committee, took an oath, and testified about his past as-
sociations with a former director of Commonwealth.
7
Based on the testimony given by Douglas, a grand jury returned an
indictment that charged Douglas with perjury and misdemeanor ob-
struction of governmental operations.8 A jury found Douglas guilty of
perjury with respect to each of the three statements made to the Com-
3. Id
4. 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986).
5. L.R. 229, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 1984 Legis. J. 179 (Jan. 4, 1984), established the Com-
monwealth Committee.
6. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 834, 388 N.W.2d 801, 802 (1986).
7. Id., 388 N.W.2d at 802.
8. Count I charged Douglas with perjury in violation of NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-915(1)
(1985) by alleging that:
[Douglas] did, after having given his oath or affirmation in a matter
where said oath or affirmation was required by law, and before an au-
thority having full power to administer the same, said being the Special
Commonwealth Committee of the Legislature of Nebraska, depose, af-
firm or declare the following matters to be fact, to-wit:
That he paid income tax on all of the payments he received from
Marvin E. Copple for services he performed for Marvin E. Copple.
That the payments he received from Marvin E. Copple for the serv-
ices he performed for said Marvin E. Copple, totalled Thirty-two
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500).
That his action as Attorney General of Nebraska has not been influ-
enced by his business or personal relationships with Marvin E.
Copple.
Further, that at the time he, Paul L. Douglas, deposed, affirmed or
declared said matters to be fact he knew the same to be false.
Count II charged Douglas with obstruction of justice under NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
901(1) (1985). Id. at 834-35, 388 N.W.2d at 802.
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mittee.9 Douglas was sentenced to three years probation, fined
$25,000, required to contribute 500 hours to community service and
pay all costs of prosecution.' 0
Douglas appealed the conviction to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The only assignment of error on appeal relevant to this discussion was:
The Court erred in failing to quash or dismiss Count I of the indictment be-
cause it failed as a matter of law to allege facts which would constitute perjury
since the statements were made in a setting where no oath was required by
law and the statements were not material to the Committee's inquiry.1 1
B. Issue
On appeal, Douglas argued that no matter what he had said while
testifying before the Committee, a perjury conviction could not be
based on such statements. His position was that even though he had
taken an oath before testifying, the oath was not an oath for purposes
of the Nebraska perjury statute.12
The language of the Nebraska perjury statute, "in any other matter
where an oath or affirmation is required by law," provided the sole
basis for Douglas' conviction since the Committee hearing was not a
judicial proceeding.' 3 Douglas argued that a specific statute must re-
quire that an oath be administered before an individual can be con-
victed of perjury.'4 Douglas argued that there was no requirement
that witnesses testifying before a legislative committee testify under
oath;15 therefore, because the oath he took was not "required by law,"
he could not be convicted of perjury.'6
The State argued that the phrase "required by law" meant that the
oath must be administered by an individual or entity possessing the
authority to administer the oath. The Committee clearly had the au-
thority to administer the oath through two grants of power.' 7 How-
ever, Douglas argued that since a legislative committee "may
administer oaths," the discretion present in the authority dictated that
9. Id. at 835, 388 N.W.2d at 802. The jury found Douglas not guilty of obstruction of
justice.
10. Brief of Appellant at 1-2, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986)
(No. 85-245).
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 13.
13. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 836, 388 N.W.2d 801, 803 (1986).
14. A, 388 N.W.2d at 803.
15. Brief of Appellant at 15, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986)
(No. 85-245).
16. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 837, 388 N.W.2d 801, 803 (1986).
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 50-103 (1984) provides: "Any member may administer oaths in
the Legislature, and while acting on a committee may administer oaths on the
business of such committee." Id NEB. REV. STAT. § 50-406 (1984) provides in
part: "In the discharge of any duty herein imposed the council, or any committee
thereof, shall have authority to administer oaths .... ." Id
1987]
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the oath was not "required by law" for purposes of the perjury statute,
and therefore the oath could not support a perjury conviction.
The issue on appeal was whether the oath taken by Douglas prior
to testifying before the Committee was one which was "required by
law" for purposes of the Nebraska perjury statute.
C. Holding
The court held that "since... there is no Nebraska statute explic-
itly requiring an oath to be administered to individuals testifying
before a legislative committee, Douglas' sworn testimony before the
Special Commonwealth Committee could not have provided the basis
for prosecution under § 28-915."18 The conviction was reversed and
the matter was remanded with directions to quash the indictment and
dismiss the proceedings.19
The court's analysis in Douglas reveals three reasons for the hold-
ing. First, the court adopted the view of Saunders v. State,20 a Texas
Criminal Court of Appeals opinion which proposed that an authoriza-
tion to administer an oath is not sufficient to meet the "required by
law" language of a perjury statute.21 Second, the court believed that
the legislative history of § 28-915 indicated that an oath taken when
testifying before a legislative committee was not an oath that could
support a perjury conviction.22 Finally, the court reasoned that, as
with all criminal statutes, a strict construction of the Nebraska per-
jury statute was required.23 Strict construction of the Nebraska per-
jury statute dictated that the authority to administer the oath did not
make the oath one which was required by law.24
III. ANALYSIS
A. Case Law
1. Majority View
Reported cases exist which are factually similar to Douglas. In
Douglas, the State argued:
[T]he majority rule is that if a governmental body, authority or agency is
18. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843, 388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
19. id-
20. 170 Tex. Crim. 358, 341 S.W.2d 173 (1960).
21. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 839, 388 N.W.2d 801, 804 (1986).
22. Id. at 840-842, 388 N.W.2d at 805-807.
23. Id at 838, 388 N.W.2d at 804.
24. The court never did state that the statute authorizing the oath must literally say
"required by law." The language "shall be administered" of NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-
1807 (1983) (dealing with coroners' inquests), is sufficient to meet the "required
by law" test of the Nebraska perjury statute, as is "all witnesses shall be duly
sworn" of NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.18(5) (1981) (concerning Real Estate Commis-
sion hearings). State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843, 388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
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vested with the statutory authority to require that testimony be adduced in its
proceedings under oath, even though the exercise of that authority is not
mandatory, such testimony adduced under oath may properly be the subject of
a perjury prosecution.
2 5
If a majority rule is established through a count of cases, the State's
assertion is correct. With one exception, all of the relevant, reported
cases dictate that the oath taken by Douglas was one which was "re-
quired by law," and therefore able to support a perjury conviction.2 6
The State argued that at least three cases established the majority
rule.27 The case most factually similar to Douglas is Commonwealth v.
Giles.28 In Giles, the defendant appeared before a legislative commit-
tee called the Crime Commission, 29 and took an oath which the com-
mittee was authorized to give.30 The perjury statute in effect in
Massachusetts at the time was very similar to the perjury statute in
Douglas.31 The Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that, as a com-
mittee of the state legislature, the Crime Commission had the author-
ity to require that an oath be administered to individuals testifying
before it.32 The Commonwealth Committee questioning Douglas had
the same power to require that an oath be taken by Douglas.33
The court in Giles held that, even though no Massachusetts statute
specifically required that an oath be administered to individuals testi-
fying before the Crime Commission, the fact that the Crime Commis-
sion was authorized to administer and require an oath was sufficient to
satisfy the language "required by law" in the Massachusetts perjury
statute.34 Giles indicates that the oath taken by Douglas is one that
could be construed as "required by law."
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court disregarded the Giles rea-
25. Brief of Appellee at 13, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986) (No.
85-245).
26. That exception is Saunders v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 358, 341 S.W.2d 173 (1960).
Saunders is discussed at pages 307-09, infra.
27. Those cases are: People v. Watson, 85 1ll. App. 3d 649, 406 N.E.2d 1148 (1980);
State v. Salafia, 29 Conn. Supp. 305, 284 A.2d 576 (1971); and Commonwealth v.
Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 213 N.E.2d 476 (1966).
28. 350 Mass. 102, 213 N.E.2d 476 (1966).
29. The Crime Commission was a legislative committee charged with investigating
corrupt practices involving government officials and a private corporation. Id. at
112, 213 N.E.2d at 483.
30. Massachusetts legislative committee members "may administer oaths to persons
examined before... committee[s]" under MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 3, § 27 (West
1986). This authority is similar to that possessed by the Commonwealth Commit-
tee. See supra note 17.
31. The Massachusetts perjury statute provided, in relevant part: "[W]hoever, being
required by law to take an oath or affirmation, wilfully swears or affirms falsely
in a matter relative to which such oath or affirmation is required, shall be guilty
of perjury." MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 268, § 1 (West 1970).
32. Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 108, 213 N.E.2d 476, 481 (1966).
33. NEB. LEG. R. 3, § 19(E)(ii) (1983).
34. Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 108, 213 N.E.2d 476, 481 (1966).
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soning in Douglas stating that the Giles majority relied "extensively
upon a close examination of the legislative history of the Massachu-
setts perjury statute," and the court found the dissent in Giles to be
"more persuasive." 35 This reasoning is problematic since the dissent
in Giles also used an extensive examination of legislative history to
support its position,3 6 so that reliance on legislative history provides
no basis on which to distinguish the Giles majority from the dissent as
the court in Douglas implied. The Nebraska court did not articulate
how the Giles statutory construction distinguished Giles from Doug-
las, or why the dissent proved more persuasive.
In People v. Watson,37 the defendant appealed a perjury conviction
resulting from sworn testimony she gave before the State Board of
Elections.38 The perjury statute in effect in Illinois stated that an oath
must be required to support a conviction.3 9 The authority of the State
Board of Elections was similar to that of the Commonwealth Commit-
tee, in that both "shall have the power to administer oaths."40 The
defendant contended that since the Board was not required to admin-
ister the oath, she could not be convicted of perjury under the Illinois
statute. The court disagreed, holding that where the oath was author-
ized, it could support a perjury conviction.41
Despite the applicability of Watson to the issue raised in Douglas,
the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to distinguish Watson, or to even
mention the case. The court should have been aware of Watson since
the State did discuss Watson in its brief.42
Finally, in State v. Salafia,43 four defendants filed motions to
quash perjury charges based on false testimony given before a coroner,
while under oath.44 The perjury statute in Connecticut expressly lim-
ited a conviction to occasions "when an oath or affirmation is required
by law."4 5 Coroners in Connecticut are officers authorized to "admin-
35. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 839, 388 N.W.2d 801, 805 (1986).
36. Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 116-118, 213 N.E.2d 476 486-87 (1966)
(Kirk, J., dissenting).
37. 85 Ill. App. 3d 649, 406 N.E.2d 1148 (1980).
38. Id. at 650, 406 N.E.2d at 1150.
39. The Illinois perjury statute provided: "A person commits perjury when, under
oath or affirmation, in a proceeding or in any other matter where by law such
oath or affirmation is required, he makes a false statement, material to the issue
or point in question, which he does not believe to be true." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 32-2(a) (1979).
40. The State Board of Election had the authority to administer oaths under ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-10 (1979). For the Commonwealth Committee's au-
thority see supra note 17.
41. People v. Watson, 85 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652, 406 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (1980).
42. See Brief of Appellee at 16, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986)
(No. 85-245).
43. 29 Conn. Supp. 305, 284 A.2d 576 (1971).
44. Id at 306, 284 A.2d at 577.
45. The relevant Connecticut perjury statute read: "Any person who wilfully or cor-
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ister oaths."46 The defendants argued that since a coroner is not re-
quired to administer an oath, a coroner's hearing is not an occasion
"when a oath or affirmation is required by law."
47
The Connecticut court responded to the defendants' arguments by
stating:
Even if such a claim were sound, where the coroner, in the lawful exercise of
his authority, has chosen to perform his official duty by placing a witness
under oath, clearly it is an occasion "when an oath or affirmation is required
by law." [citation omitted] The witness could be compelled to attend the hear-
ing and could not refuse to testify under oath without being subject to
contempt.
4 8
The court concluded that where the coroner had the authority to ad-minister an oath, the oath was one which was "required by law" for
purposes of the Connecticut perjury statute.49
The Nebraska perjury statute is similar to the statute in Salafia.50
Also, the Commonwealth Committee had the same authority to ad-
minister an oath, and to compel the attendance of witnesses. 51 Salafia
is, therefore, factually similar to Douglas. However, the Nebraska
Supreme Court once again failed to mention this applicable opinion,
even though the State discussed Salafia in its brief.52
The above cases support the State's contention that a majority-of
jurisdictions which have addressed the issue in Douglas have found
that where the administering of an oath is authorized, the oath is one
which is "required by law" for purposes of a perjury statute. In fact, of
the reported cases, only one case, Saunders v. State,53 has not adopted
this view. The Nebraska Supreme Court decided to adopt Saunders.
2. Saunders v. State
In Saunders, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
question of whether false testimony given before an investigatory
committee of the Texas Legislature constituted perjury under a stat-
ute which defined perjury as a false statement made under oath or
ruptly swears, affirms or testifies falsely to any material matter when an oath or
affirmation is required by law [shall be guilty of perjury]." CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-143 (1960).
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-24 (1969).
47. State v. Salafia, 29 Conn. Supp. 305, 307, 284 A.2d 576, 577 (1971).
48. Id at 311-12, 284 A.2d at 579.
49. Id at 312, 284 A.2d at 580.
50. Compare the Nebraska perjury statute, note 2, supra, with the Connecticut per-
jury statute, note 45, supra.
51. The Commonwealth Committee had the authority to subpoena witnesses under
NEB. REV. STAT. § 50-105 (1984). For the power to administer oaths see supra
note 17.
52. See Brief of Appellee at 14, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986)
(No. 85-245).
53. 170 Tex. Crim. 358, 341 S.W.2d 173 (1960).
1987]
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affirmation in "circumstances in which [such] oath or affirmation is
required by law."54 Like the Commonwealth Committee, the Texas
committee was empowered to administer an oath.55
The court in Saunders asked the question: "Can it be said that an
oath administered by [a legislative committee is] ... one which is re-
quired by law?"56 The answer and the extent of the court's analysis:
"We think not."57 From the one page majority opinion and a concur-
ring opinion of Saunders, the court in Douglas concluded:
The general proposition established in Saunders v. State, [citation omitted]
therefore, is that for an oath to be one which is "required by law," a specific
statute must explicitly require that an oath be administered. That an individ-
ual or entity possesses the authority to administer an oath is not sufficient to
implicate the more restrictive language "required by law."
'5 8
Adoption of the minority view espoused by Saunders is problem-
atic for at least two reasons. First, the dissent in Saunders tried to
illustrate that the court had not considered the implications of its
holding by pointing out that Texas also had no statute "specifically
requiring witnesses to be sworn in judicial proceedings (in court)."59
The dissent argued, and reasonably so, that the court had not suffi-
ciently considered the effect of a holding so broad as to allow a person
under oath to lie in a judicial proceeding with impunity.6o Similarly,
the Lancaster County trial court, in responding to Douglas' motion to
quash his indictment because the oath was not "required by law," com-
mented, "[a] reading of the Saunders case does not leave one with the
impression that it represents careful legal analysis."61
Second, it is informative to recognize that the Texas House and
Senate amended the Texas perjury statute shortly after Saunders. In
1960, when Saunders was decided, perjury could only be committed
"under circumstances in which an oath or affirmation [was] required
by law."62 The Texas perjury statute was amended in 1961 to include
any oath "necessary for the conduct of any official hearing, inquiry,
meeting, or investigation by any legislative committee or other instru-
mentality of government having legal authority to issue process for
54. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 302 (Vernon 1952).
55. The Texas committee's authorization came from TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5429a (Vernon 1958) which states that a committee "is empowered to administer
oaths to witnesses in any case under their examination." Id
56. Saunders v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 358, 360, 341 S.W.2d 173, 174 (1960)."
57. Id.
58. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 839, 388 N.W.2d 801, 804-05 (1986).
59. Saunders v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 358, 368, 341 S.W.2d 173, 179 (1960) (Woodley, J.,
dissenting).
60. Md
61. State v. Douglas, Doc. 66 Page 285, at 14 (Order of Lancaster Co. Dist. Court Feb.
15, 1985).
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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the attendance of witnesses."63 One could reasonably argue that the
construction given the statute in Saunders, to exclude oaths taken
before a legislative committee, induced the Texas House and Senate to
statutorily overrule Saunders one year after the opinion was written.
This action may illustrate disagreement with the construction given
the statute in Saunders64 and helps to explain why, in the twenty-
seven years since Saunders was rendered, no reported opinion has
ever cited the case as authority until Douglas.
An examination of the reported cases indicates that the most cur-
rent,6 5 and a majority of the cases hold that an authorization to admin-
ister an oath is sufficient to meet the "required by law" language of
relevant perjury statutes. The court in Douglas chose not to follow
the majority rule. Following the minority rule is not, in and of itself,
unwise, but the court never articulated why the majority rule should
be disregarded in favor of the minority rule. Saunders provided no
analysis for its conclusion, and the court in Douglas gave little justifi-
cation for its adoption of Saunders. It is strange to ignore a majority
view without discussion while adopting a minority view which other
courts have ignored, and which the Texas House and Senate took af-
firmative steps to nullify.
B. Legislative History
The court in Douglas found the legislative history of the Nebraska
perjury statute significant after performing an accurate analysis of the
history. The Nebraska perjury statute's "required by law" language
has remained unchanged for at least one hundred years.6 6 The court
63. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 302 (Vernon Supp. 1973).
64. According to the Legislative Reference Library for the Texas House and Senate,
no legislative history was compiled for Texas statutes prior to 1973. Telephone
interview with Sally Reynolds, Director of Legislative Reference Library (Oct.
17, 1986). Therefore, one can only speculate as to the legislative reaction to Saun-
ders. The Texas House and Senate may have believed that Saunders was correct
and that the Texas perjury statute was flawed. Conversely, the legislative bodies
may have disagreed with Saunders and decided to amend the perjury statute in
1961 to prevent the reoccurence of such statutory construction. Whatever the
motivation for the amendment, it is clear that the Texas House and Senate
wanted the sanctions for perjury to extend to materially false testimony given
before a legislative committee.
65. Saunders, decided in 1960, is the oldest of the relevant cases discussed. The more
current view holds that testimony given before a legislative committee authorized
to give an oath can support a perjury conviction. For the dates of those opinions
see supra note 27.
66. NEB. GEN. STAT. ch. 58, § 155 (1873) stated in part: "If any person having taken a
lawful oath, or made lawful affirmation in any judicial proceeding, or in any
other matter where, by law, an oath or affirmation is required. . . ." Id (empha-
sis added). The "required by law" language has survived several criminal code
revisions and was a part of the Nebraska perjury statute construed in Douglas.
See supra note 2.
1987]
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found this fact important, since an overall revision of the criminal
statutes in 1977 failed to change the "required by law" standard in the
perjury statute.6
7
In 1969, the Nebraska Legislature passed a resolution authorizing a
general revision of the Nebraska Penal Code.6 8 Pursuant to the reso-
lution, a commission was formed to study the entire penal code. The
commission recommended that the Legislature adopt the Model Penal
Code provision concerning perjury.69 At the time of the revision of
§ 28-915, the Model Penal Code stated that "[a] person is guilty of per-
jury... if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under
oath."70 "Official proceeding means a proceeding heard or which may
be heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative or other gov-
ernmental agency .... -71 Clearly an oath taken before a legislative
committee would have supported a perjury conviction under the stat-
ute recommended by the revision committee.72
The Model Penal Code provision was introduced for adoption in
1973.73 However, the bill was amended with the Model Penal Code
language being struck in favor of the language contained in § 28-915. 74
The revision had proposed a significant expansion of the perjury stat-
ute through adoption of the Model Penal Code provisions. However,
the Legislature amended the proposed perjury statute to such an ex-
tent that the bill which was finally passed did not differ significantly
from any previous perjury statute. The court stated:
[W]e find it persuasive that the Nebraska Legislature, in enacting § 28-915,
chose not to adopt the Model Penal Code provision but, instead, expressly re-
jected the broad language of the Model Penal Code and elected to adhere to
the general notion originally expressed in § 28-701, that criminal perjury is
limited to situations where an oath is "required by law."
7 5
The court interpreted the adoption of the restrictive language of
§ 28-915 as an indication of the Legislature's intent to have the perjury
statute construed strictly and applied narrowly. The court stated that
to do otherwise would be "to create, in the guise of judicial construc-
tion, a new perjury statute."76 A fair reading of the legislative history
indicates that on the close calls, where a liberal reading of the statute
and public policy might call for a conviction under the statute, the
statute should be construed strictly to preclude the conviction.
67. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 842, 388 N.W.2d 801, 806 (1986).
68. L.R. 39, 80th Leg., 2d Sess., 1969 Legis. J. 1589 (Apr. 22, 1969).
69. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 841, 388 N.W.2d 801, 806 (1986).
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (1985).
71. Id. at § 240.0(4).
72. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 841, 388 N.W.2d 801, 806 (1986).
73. L.B. 8, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. (1973).
74. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 841, 388 N.W.2d 801, 806 (1986).
75. Id. at 842, 388 N.W.2d at 806.
76. Id-, 388 N.W.2d at 807.
[Vol. 66:827
STATE v. DOUGLAS
It is true that no Nebraska statute literally states that the oath
which Douglas took was "required by law." However, in undertaking
such a literal analysis, the court seemed to place form over substance.
First, the court's literal construction of § 28-915, due in part to the leg-
islative history of § 28-915, seems inconsistent with the Legislature's
grant of authority to committees to swear witnesses. As a result of
Douglas, a committee's authority to administer oaths has become an
empty delegation of authority. What purpose could the authority to
administer an oath have when a witness can testify falsely before a
legislative committee with impunity? The court effectively made a
mockery of the statutory grant of power to a legislative committee.
Second, the court's construction is not entirely consistent with
other legislative enactments. Arguably, a person can be convicted of
perjury in Nebraska for falsely testifying before a legislative commit-
tee while under oath. When Douglas testified before the Committee,
Rule 3 § 19(e)(ii) 77 of the Rules of the Nebraska Unicameral Legisla-
ture provided that "[a]ll testimony given or offered at [a committee
hearing] ... shall be under oath or affirmation if the witness has been
subpoenaed, and in other cases if the majority of the committee mem-
bers present at the hearing so decide."78 Therefore, under the Rules
of the Nebraska Unicameral, the Legislature has clearly shown an in-
tent that an oath taken before a legislative committee may be one
which is required.7
9
It is true that legislative rules are not a "specific statute explicitly
requir[ing] an oath to be administered," as required by the court in
Douglas.80 Nevertheless, the rules should be given statutory effect
since they are passed by a majority of the Legislature like any other
statutory enactment. Through Rule 3 § 19(E)(ii), the Legislature evi-
denced an intent that an oath could be required when testifying before
a legislative committee, and the legislative history of § 28-915 should
not be construed so strictly so as to negate that intent.
Finally, the court failed to discuss the fact that Douglas was actu-
ally required to take an oath before testifying before the Committee.
77. This is now Rule 3 § 20(E)(ii) of the 1987 Rules of the Nebraska Unicameral
Legislature. NEB. LEG. R. 3, § 20(E)(ii) (1987).
78. NEB. LEG. R. 3, § 19(E)(ii) (1983). Section 19 of Rule 3 outlined the subpoena
power of a legislative committee.
79. The language "shall be under oath or affirmation" in Rule 3 is similar to the
language in NEB. REV. STAT. § 23 -1807 (1983) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.18(5)
(1981). See supra note 25. The court implied that the language of both these stat-
utes meets the "required by law" standard. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843,
388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
80. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843, 388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
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C. Oath was Required by the Committee
When Douglas testified before the Committee, he did not choose to
take an oath, he was required to take an oath. The Committee had
adopted rules to govern its proceedings, one of which specifically re-
quired all testimony to be taken under oath or affirmation.8 1 By re-
fusing to attend, be sworn, or to be examined as a witness before the
Committee, Douglas could have been punished with contempt.8 2 This
same contempt sanction is available under Nebraska statutes requir-
ing an oath for purposes of the perjury statute.
8 3
The Committee had the authority to require the oath under the
resolution establishing the Committee. The resolution provided in
part that "[t]he committee shall follow Rule 3, Section 19, of the Rules
of the Nebraska Unicameral, regarding subpoena procedure."8 4 Rule
3 authorized a majority of the Committee to decide whether Commit-
tee witnesses like Douglas would be required to take an oath.8 By a
majority vote, the Committee decided to require that all testimony be
taken under oath.
Douglas did take the required oath. The fighting issue was
whether this was a required oath for purposes of § 28-915. The State
argued that the Legislature was exercising its constitutional power
under Article III, Section 10 of the constitution of the State of Ne-
braska in adopting a rule of procedure for its hearings.8 6 The State
contended that the Committee rule requiring an oath should have
been given the force of law, and therefore, the required oath could
support a perjury conviction.8 7
Douglas argued that the Committee's decision to require an oath
could not possibly "rise to the dignity of law."ss Douglas contended
that an unconstitutional delegation of power to define what consti-
81. The Commonwealth Committee Rules provided in part:
"6. That the following described procedures shall be utilitized dur-
ing the Committee meeting: ...
d. Each witness shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth .... "
Brief of Appellee on Motion for Rehearing at 9, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833,
388 N.W.2d 801 (1986) (No. 85-245).
82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 50-105 (1984).
83. For example, a witness that is required by law to be sworn before a court under
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-604 (1985), can be punished with contempt under NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-2121 (1985).
84. L.R. 229, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 1984 Legis. J. 179, 181 (Jan. 4, 1984).
85. See supra note 78, and accompanying text.
86. Brief of Appellee at 18, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986) (No.
85-245).
87. Brief of Appellee on Motion for Rehearing at 11, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833,
388 N.W.2d 801 (1986) (No. 85-245).
88. Brief of Appellant at 15, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986)
(No. 85-245).
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tutes a crime or any essential element of a crime would occur if the
Committee's decision to require an oath was enforced for purposes of
the perjury statute.89 Basically, Douglas contended that the full Leg-
islature would have had to require that he take the oath before it
could be an oath for purposes of § 28-915.
The power to create criminal offenses and prescribe penalties is
exclusively vested in the Legislature, and this power cannot be dele-
gated to any administrative or executive body.90 The scope of the del-
egable authority to a legislative committee is not clearly defined.
Even so, Douglas' arguments were weak, since it is questionable
whether any legislative authority was delegated to the Committee.
The Committee was not exercising "power to make a law" by de-
fining what constituted the crime of perjury, as Douglas argued.9 ' The
elements of perjury are set out in § 28-915, and the Committee in no
way changed that definition. At most, the Committee created an at-
mosphere in which the crime of perjury could be committed by ad-
ministering an oath that it was authorized to give, just as a court,92 a
coroner,93 or a real estate commissioner 94 would create such an
atmosphere.
Probably the most glaring omission in Douglas was the court's
complete failure to discuss or discount the fact that the Committee did
require Douglas to take an oath. The lack of attention to the issue was
not due to the court's ignorance of the issue. Both Douglas and the
State discussed the issue at length in their briefs.95 Also, Saunders v.
State, the opinion which the Douglas court found "applicable to the
case before us"96 analyzed whether the resolution creating the com-
mittee pertinent to that case made the oath taken one which was re-
quired by law.9 7 The court in Douglas failed to discuss the question.
The inference is that by not considering the fact that the Commit-
tee did require an oath to be administered to Douglas, the court simply
did not believe that the oath was one required by law for purposes of
§ 28-915. The holding of Douglas requires that a "specific statute ex-
plicitly requires an oath to be administered."98 Evidently, the court
89. 1&
90. Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
91. Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801
(1986) (No. 85-245).
92. See infra note 106.
93. See infra note 107.
94. See infra note 108.
95. See Brief of Appellant at 15; Brief of Appellee at 18; Brief of Appellee on Motion
for Rehearing at 8-11, State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986) (No.
85-245).
96. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 840, 388 N.W.2d 801, 805 (1986).
97. Saunders v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 358, 359-60, 341 S.W.2d 173, 174 (1960).
98. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843, 388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
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did not consider the Committee rule, condoned by the full Legislature,
to rise to the status of a statute. If so, the court should have made that
finding clear. The fact that Douglas was required to take an oath was
important enough to warrant a discussion as to why the required oath
was not "required by law" for purposes of § 28-915.
D. Statutory Construction
In conjunction with the legislative history review, the court also
reviewed the basic rules of statutory construction of criminal stat-
utes.99 The court concluded that a criminal statute must be construed
"according to the plain import of the language in which it is written"
and "no person shall be punished for an offense which is not made
penal by the plain import of the words."100 "[I]t is a fundamental prin-
cipal of statutory construction that a penal statute is to be strictly
construed."o1 0
However, the court has also recognized in other opinions that a
criminal statute "should be construed in the context of the objective
sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs that are sought to
be remedied, and the purpose for which it serves."1 02 Courts should
adopt a construction which "best harmonizes with the context and ap-
parent policy and objects of the Legislature."1 03 Finally, while penal
statutes must be strictly construed, "it is not proper to give a strained
or unnatural construction."
1 04
The statutory construction rules above are based on the need to
provide fair notice of what conduct is criminal. Accomplishing the
goal of providing fair notice does not mean that every criminal statute
should be given the narrowest possible meaning.1 05 The question per-
tinent to Douglas was: Did Douglas have fair notice from the Ne-
braska perjury statute that falsely testifying, while under oath, before
the Committee could result in a perjury conviction?
Naturally, a person can be convicted of perjury for violating an
oath while testifying as a witness in a judicial proceeding.06 Few peo-
ple would dispute that such a witness is on notice that false testimony
could result in a perjury conviction. But a person is also susceptible to
perjuring himself/herself by deposing, affirming, or declaring any
99. Id. at 837-38, 388 N.W.2d at 804.
100. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-106 (1985). See also State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d
609 (1975).
101. State v. Suhr, 207 Neb. 553, 560, 300 N.W.2d 25, 29 (1980).
102. State v. Lewis, 184 Neb. 111, 119, 165 N.W.2d 569, 575 (1969).
103. State v. Reich, 186 Neb. 289, 291, 183 N.W.2d 223, 224 (1971).
104. State v. Ewing, 221 Neb. 462, 467, 378 N.W.2d 158, 162 (1985).
105. United States v. Speidel, 562 F.2d 1129, 1131 (8th Cir. 1977).
106. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-603 (1985) requires that all witnesses in judicial proceedings
"shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirma-
tion." Id.
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matter to be fact, knowing the same to be false when testifying before
a coroner's inquest 0 7 or at a real estate license application hearing.108
Is a legislative committee hearing different from the above proceed-
ings for purposes of providing notice of possible perjury sanctions?
Arguably not, especially when the person said to have no notice of
possible sanctions is the chief law enforcement official for the State of
Nebraska.
Regarding the notice given to a person testifying before a legisla-
tive committee by a perjury statute similar to § 28-915, the court in
Giles commented, "the ordinary meaning of that language would put
any person on notice that his conduct will be criminal if he wilfully
lies under oath before a body such as [a legislative committee."109
None of the cases which have construed perjury statutes similar to
Nebraska's have held that the statute fails to give fair notice that false
testimony, given while under oath, before a legislative committee, can
be used as a basis for a perjury conviction. Similarly, the trial court
was very skeptical of any implication that Douglas did not have fair
notice of a possible perjury conviction, stating:
There can be little doubt that the statutes of the State of Nebraska and the
rules of the Legislature and the Special Commonwealth Committee put the
defendant on notice that violation of the oath to tell the truth could result in
criminal sanctions. This was not an ordinary legislative committee but an in-
vestigative body charged with looking into any possible involvement or wrong-
doing by officials of the state with respect to the collapse of a sizable financial
institution. The defendant's awareness of the oath is emphasized by his spe-
cific reminders to the committee that he was testifying under oath.1 1 0
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not say whether Douglas had
fair notice from § 28-915 that his statements given before the Commit-
tee could support a perjury conviction. The Douglas opinion cites the
rules of strict construction necessary to insure that a potential defend-
ant receives fair notice. However, the opinion never explains how the
trial court's construction of the statute with regard to notice was in-
correct. Presumably, the court included the rules of construction cited
in Douglas as support for a reversal of the conviction, but the court
failed to take the last step of explaining why Douglas did not have fair
notice. This step may have been omitted since it arguably strains the
concept of reasonableness to conclude that Douglas did not have fair
notice.
107. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1807 (1983). See also State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843, 388
N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.18(5) (1981). See also State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 843,
388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1986).
109. Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 108-09, 213 N.E.2d 476, 481-82 (1966).
110. State v. Douglas, Doc. 66 Page 285, at 17 (Order of Lancaster Co. Dist. Court Feb.
15, 1985).
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IV. CONCLUSION
On a first reading, State v. Douglas seems well written and thor-
ough. However, after some research several omissions are revealed
that do materially affect the soundness of the decision.
First, the clear majority rule among other jurisdictions considering
the issue in Douglas establishes that the oath taken by Douglas was an
oath "required by law" for purposes of perjury statutes like § 28-915.
The court's reliance on one opinion of questionable validity is ill-
placed.
Second, while the legislative history of the Nebraska perjury stat-
ute does indicate that the statute should be construed narrowly, the
literal interpretation given the statute by the court effectively gutted
the grant of authority to administer oaths given to legislative commit-
tees. Also, it is clear that the Legislature has contemplated, through
its rules of procedure, that oaths can be required for persons appear-
ing before a committee.
Third, the court did not indicate why Douglas did not have fair no-
tice that his testimony could be used to support a perjury conviction.
A statement of all the rules of statutory construction is of little value
unless the rules are applied to the facts in an effort to justify the
holding.
The Legislature's response to State v. Douglas has been predictable
and quick. Two legislative billsill to amend Nebraska's perjury stat-
ute were introduced in the last session of the Legislature for adoption.
One bill simply changed the perjury statute so that an oath can sup-
port a perjury conviction where the oath is "required or authorized by
law."112 The other bill was patterned after the Model Penal Code per-
jury provision.113 Under that bill:
A person is guilty of perjury ... if in any official proceeding he or she makes a
false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the
truth of a statement previously made, when the statement is material and he
or she does not believe it to be true.
1 1 4
"Official proceeding shall mean a proceeding heard or which may be
heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other govern-
mental agency.... " 115 Under either bill, an oath given by a legislative
committee supports a perjury conviction.
The Legislature did pass L.B. 451 and the bill was approved by
Governor Orr on May 29, 1987. The bill was enacted as an emergency
amendment and therefore went into effect immediately. Hopefully,
111. L.B. 451, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 21, 1987) and L.B. 452, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan.
21, 1987), were introduced to amend NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-915 (1985).
112. L.B. 452, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 21, 1987) (emphasis added).
113. L.B. 451, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 21, 1987).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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the perjury statute as amended will receive a judicial construction
which is supported by coherent reasoning.
Todd W. Ruskamp '88
